Cities, Schools and Social Progress:  
The Impact of School Reform Policies on Low-Income Communities of Color  
Pedro A. Noguera  
New York University

Jane Jacobs, the widely respected urban planner, scholar and activist, once pointed out that cities are organic spaces that evolve and transform over time (1961). Like forests, prairies and marshlands, the ecosystems of cities are subject to constant change, transforming in response to local political, economic and social trends as well as broader changes occurring in the society at large (Castells 1983). While cities are by no means invulnerable to changes triggered by the natural environment (e.g. climate change, earth quakes, hurricanes, etc.) human initiatives are more often the primary sources of change in the urban landscape.

For example, Yardley Street in the South Bronx has served as the backdrop for Presidents starting with Carter who used it to talk about urban decay, to Reagan who used it to talk about how tax incentives could spur development, to Clinton who used it to make commentary on possibilities for urban renewal in America (Grogan & Proscio, 2001; (Worth, 1999; Raines, 1980). Each presidential visit offered a new opportunity to make a point about the role of public policy in alleviating poverty, stimulating economic growth or stabilizing low-income urban communities. The fate of communities like the South Bronx, one of the poorest in the United States, has been influenced by economic growth and decline, shifts in population that occur as a result of immigration, gentrification and the return of the middle class to certain blocks (real estate agents call it SoBro), and changes engineered by policymakers and planners who decide to erect a new housing, a highway or hospital.
At times, the pace of change may seem gradual, occurring almost imperceptibly across decades such as when a major city like New Bedford, Buffalo or Flint ceases to be a major hub of industry and commerce, and gradually becomes a substantially smaller, economically depressed city that is a shadow of its formerly vibrant and vital self. At other times, change can be dramatic and rapid such as when a major new corporation arrives (e.g. Google in San Francisco) or departs (e.g. General Motors in Detroit), bringing with it profound shifts in population, employment, housing values and quality of life. In almost all cases, the changes that dramatically alter the character and landscape of a city also produce beneficiaries who gain from new jobs, parks and transportation, as well as those whose fortunes decline as they are pushed out or left behind to contend with a diminished quality of life. More often than not, it is the non-white urban poor – African Americans, Latinos, new immigrants, etc. who have endured the negative consequences of change.

For many years, urban public schools were the one aspect of cities that were least likely to change. Certainly, the composition of urban schools has been dramatically altered over time by shifts in population brought about by “white flight” and the arrival of new immigrants. But, even when the population served changed, schools provided urban communities with a sense of continuity and stability through their steady presence. Such stability has been important to many communities, but in those that are economically and socially marginal, the ones William Julius Wilson described as “no zones” - no banks, no supermarkets, no libraries or post offices (1987), public schools have been especially important. In
blighted neighborhoods, even when middle class homeowners, banks and private industry have fled, public schools have generally remained, providing an anchor and source of stability for those left behind. To be certain, they remained not necessarily because they performed well or succeeded in carrying out their mission – educating children, but because for as long as there were families with children present, schools have been required to serve them. In this way public schools, even flawed and troubled ones, have often managed to provide a degree of continuity that creates a semblance of order that has been important to communities characterized by disorder and disarray.

In recent years, the stability once provided by public schools to urban neighborhoods has become a thing of the past as a new generation of reformers has undertaken the task of radically transforming the character of public schools. Typically, the reformers have rationalized changes that have been promoted as being necessary to improve the performance of schools with long track records of failure. However, in their zeal to overhaul public education, the reformers have often displayed little attention or regard to how their work has affected the communities where these flawed but stable institutions were located.

In many respects, No Child Left Behind (NCLB), the federal law enacted in 2001, was the starting point for the current period of reform (Mehta 2013). Though it could be argued that the nation has been in a perpetual state of education reform since the Soviet Union launched Sputnik (Cuban and Tyack 1995), none of the policy measures adapted to reform public education have been as far-reaching or profound as NCLB. In fact, the impact of NCLB may well prove to be as significant to the
character of American education as the *Brown decision* of 1954 and the enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (Title I) in 1964, both of which have widely been regarded as watersheds of American public policy (Tyack and Cuban 1995). NCLB influence has been attributed to the fact that it significantly expanded the federal role in education and ushered in a new series of reforms under the banner of standards-based accountability (Mehta 2013). Since the enactment of NCLB, states have adopted high stakes assessments to monitor student achievement, and in recent years, embraced a series of new reforms for the purpose of accelerating the pace of change. Some of these measures include: school choice, charter schools, mayoral control, portfolio management, and most recently, the common core standards (McDonald 2014; Fullan 2014). While many of these policies have been directed at public education generally, their most profound impact has been on cities where the need for change has been seen as greatest (Lipman 2011). A smaller number of cities have also created and significantly expanded the number of community schools; schools that provide a full range of services to children and families including a variety social services and afterschool programs (Dryfoos, Quinn and Barkin 2005). While there have been numerous studies documenting and analyzing the impact of reform on schools (Brill 2011; Fullan 2014; McDonald 2014), relatively little research and scholarship has been devoted to the way this agenda has affected urban neighborhoods.

As I will show in the pages ahead, the reforms that are occurring in American cities today are dramatically changing the character of schools and the communities they serve. In this paper I explore how the reform strategies pursued in two cities:
New York and Tulsa-Union, have affected the character of the communities where they have been targeted. I focus in particular on mayoral control, school closures, the expansion of charter schools and the expansion of community schools because they provide an interesting lens through which to compare and contrast the changes that are occurring in urban communities as a result of school reform.

As I present this analysis I try to remain aware that school reform has not been the only political, environmental or economic trend that is altering the character of cities. In New York and Tulsa-Union, gentrification, immigration, de-industrialization and the machinations of local politics, have played major roles in transforming neighborhoods. However, I focus on school reform because while considerable attention has been focused on understanding how communities are affected by these trends, comparatively less attention has been directed to the impact of education reform. Throughout this analysis I consider how school reform is affecting community well-being, a term most often associated with public health (Syme 2004), because it makes it possible to assess how the quality of life experienced by the poor and economically vulnerable, has been affected by the current wave of school reform policies.

The experience of New York and Tulsa-Union (Tulsa-Union is actually two cities that form part of the larger metropolitan area) provides a useful context for illuminating the impact of different aspects of the current reform agenda. Whereas New York has been an experimental laboratory for what is now referred to as “market-based reform”, Tulsa-Union have been at the forefront of the community schools movement, which has expanded access to early childhood and afterschool
programs, and a variety of school-based social services. The differences in the paths
taken allow for a rich comparative analysis that sheds further light on the social
consequences of education reform.

In addition, throughout the paper I make the race and class impact of policy
central to the analysis. I do so because the communities where these reforms have
been carried out are largely comprised of low-income African Americans, Latinos
and new immigrants. As I will show, understanding the social and political
dynamics between local residents and the largely white political and economic elites
who have championed and implemented education reforms is essential for shedding
light on how the politics of education reform is influencing conditions in
impoverished communities and affecting the character of the modern American city.

In post civil rights America race is often unmentioned in policy discourse in part to
maintain a façade of color blindness (Carter and Tuitt 2014). Given the clear
evidence of widening racial disparities in education and throughout American
society (Carter and Wellner 2013), it is increasingly important to not only dispel the
façade of post-racialism but to directly examine the race/class implications of public
policy.

The Search for a Solution to the Urban Education Dilemma

In 1988, education scholar, Gene Maeroff wrote an important article entitled
“Withered hopes, stillborn dreams: The dismal panorama of urban education”. In
this unrestrained indictment of educational policy he wrote: “...the educational
reform movement has proven largely irrelevant to urban minority students' needs.
Dropout prevention programs have bestowed meaningless diplomas, while side-stepping the *root causes* of failure and underachievement." (p. 16) He went on to cite an array of data to document the extent of the problems afflicting urban schools including: high dropout rates, low math and reading scores, incidents of violence and dilapidated facilities. From there he goes on to discuss what he regarded as the “root cause” of pervasive failure: racial segregation and deeply entrenched inter-generational poverty. He points out that none of the educational policies pursued at the federal, state or local level were addressing these issues (Maeroff: 37-39).

Undoubtedly, a similar article on the current state of urban education in the United States could be written today, and it would not differ markedly from the picture Maeroff described nearly thirty years ago. Despite numerous reforms, graduation rates in the fifty largest cities have risen only slightly to 53% (America’s Promise Alliance 2014) in the last twenty years. While several cities have experienced improved performance on the National Assessment for Educational Progress (NAEP), SAT and ACT scores have remained largely stagnant (Barton and Coley 2010). Moreover, even cities such as Boston, Charlotte, Houston and Miami that have been awarded the Broad Prize for excellence in urban education and are frequently cited as bright spots among large urban school districts (Council of Great City Schools), disparities in academic performance between cities and surrounding suburbs largely remain.

Of course the problem is not merely related to geography. In many American cities there are a certain number of high performing public schools. However, more often than not, these successful schools screen out the most disadvantaged children
and often serve a more privileged student population. There are also a number of high performing urban public schools that serve low-income students (Chenowith 2010). However, these are few in number, and their existence is insufficient to offset the “dismal panorama” described by Maeroff. In fact, nearly all of the schools recognized by state departments of education as “failing” or in need of improvement are composed of low-income, African American and Latino students (US Department of Education 2013). Despite the wave of reform ushered in by the adoption of NCLB, it largely continues to be the case that wherever poor children are concentrated the quality of education they receive is poor and school failure is the norm (Boykin and Noguera 2011).

Of course, pervasive failure in urban education is not a new phenomenon. In 1961, former Harvard University President James B. Conant, made observations that mirror those of Maeroff in his book Slums and Suburbs (1961). After describing the deplorable conditions he found in what he called “slum schools” he writes that “…we are allowing a social dynamite to accumulate in our large cities…”. He goes on to add that “…the continuation of this situation is a menace to the social and political health of the large cities.” (p.2) Like Maeroff, Conant recognized that addressing social and economic conditions in the communities where “negro” children resided was essential if schools were to be improved. Writing in 1961, before the riots that erupted in cities throughout the US later in the 1960s, he seems almost prophetic. Conant recognized that the harsh conditions in the “negro slums” were generating “social dynamite”. Like Maeroff he also understood that the problem of urban education could not be addressed without confronting racial segregation and
concentrated poverty in inner-city neighborhoods, a recognition that is scarcely mentioned by reformers today (Rothstein 2004).

In subsequent years, the task of explaining the underlying causes of America’s urban education dilemma has been taken up by scholars like Michelle Fine in *Framing Dropouts* (1988), who described a pattern of indifference and neglect in the management of urban schools that literally results in some students being pushed out of school. Others, such as author Jean Anyon (1997), have documented how deeply entrenched political corruption, nepotism and patronage have made it possible for a small number of politicians and contractors to extract financial benefits from urban school systems while allowing deeply flawed schools to remain in disarray. In *Getting What We Ask For*, sociologist Charles Payne (1994) went a step further, showing how the gaps between policy and practice produced a system where those with power and authority cast blame on those who work in schools, or the children and families that are served, while simultaneously distancing themselves from the disorder and dysfunction in the school systems they are ostensibly responsible for.

More recently, several studies have attempted to explain why the current wave of school reform has yielded so little progress in improving the nation’s urban schools. In an important longitudinal study on Chicago public schools, Anthony Bryke and his colleagues analyzed how schools responded to the various reform strategies that were implemented over a ten-year period (2010). Bryke and his colleagues showed how concentrated poverty frequently overwhelmed schools and contributed to their failure. The authors also identified five essential ingredients
that they found were present in schools that experienced improvement that was sustained over time. Finally, in a recent book Joseph McDonald analyzes reforms carried out in several major cities over a thirty-year period. Like Payne he finds a lack of attention to addressing school climate and culture, and like Bryke et.al. he finds insufficient attention to the “essential ingredients” of change. McDonald goes further in pointing out that as poverty and inequality have increased in urban districts it is increasingly important for reforms to address the social needs of children. He writes:

The continuing practice of urban school reform must take seriously the impact of poverty on schools. This need not be, and should not be, about excusing poor performance by students, teachers, schools, or districts. Nor should it be based on the faulty idea that poor children in general cannot learn at high levels... schools serving deeply disadvantaged neighborhoods, where social capital is low, are often distracted from efforts to build sufficiently strong academic systems by the poverty that accompanies a significant proportion of their children to school every day. What reformers need to do, following the model of Geoffrey Canada, James Comer, and others, is to take this problem into account in their formulation of theories of action, and they also need to raise and deploy extra resources to deal with it. (p. 143)

Among the existing studies of urban education, my own book City Schools and the American Dream (2003) is one of few that attempted to link problems related to school performance directly to the social context of urban areas. Focusing on urban schools in the Bay Area of northern California, I posited that the interaction of factors that are external to schools, namely, concentrated poverty, political indifference toward the plight of poor neighborhoods and weak social capital within

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1 According to Bryke et.al. the five essential ingredients needed for school improvement are: 1) an instructional guidance system; 2) continuous professional capacity building; 3) a student centered learning climate; 4) strong parent and community partnerships; and 5) strong leadership.
them, helped to produce school failure; a phenomenon that throughout the US is intimately associated with the race and class of students. These external conditions contribute to the development of internal dynamics within schools that become manifest in the form of structural barriers (e.g. tracking, teacher assignment, inequities in resources that are allocated by administrators, etc.) and the development of cultural patterns (e.g. low teacher expectations, differential discipline practices, etc.) negatively influence school performance and undermine academic outcomes among low-income students of color. Several authors have argued that inequality and poverty are the primary causes of lower school and student performance (Rothstein 2004; Barton and Coley 2010; Ravitch 2010). While my argument does not dispute this contention it differs from these and others by recognizing the dynamic created by the interaction of the external and internal factors and their role in perpetuating and maintaining race and class disparities in achievement (2003).

In *City Schools* I also argued that while the external-internal dynamics were different in high wealth cities like San Francisco and Berkeley, the outcomes for low-income students of color were remarkably similar to those obtained in high poverty cities like Oakland and Richmond, despite the fact that the former spent considerably more per student than the latter. My conclusion was that student and school performance was inextricably connected to how individuals and groups accessed power and resources both within and outside of schools. For this reason, academic outcomes for students were much more likely to be related to their race and class and where they lived with respect to the race-class composition of their
neighborhood, than the school district they attended. Schools, like other public services and institutions (e.g. hospitals, police departments and public transportation) respond to the needs of communities based to a large degree on the power and social capital they exert (Coleman 1998; Stone et.al. 2001; Noguera 2003).

*Placing Race and Class at the Center*

Though urban schools were not the focus of their analysis, both William Julius Wilson (1989) and Loic Waquant (2001) came to similar conclusions about the persistence of poverty in their study of economically marginalized urban communities. In a far-reaching study of poverty in African American communities in Chicago, Wilson showed that de-industrialization led to the loss of economic opportunities and social isolation in inner city neighborhoods (1987). He also showed that as the economy changed social problems such as crime, violence and teen pregnancy increased. Wilson argued that local institutions such as public schools were limited in their ability to counter the adverse conditions in the urban environment. For Wilson, the problem was rooted in a political economy that produced social isolation and concentrated poverty, and alleviating these conditions had to be the focus of reform.

Drawing upon a historical framework to illuminate how ghetto communities emerged, Waquant went a step further than Wilson. He argued that the emergence of ghettos was directly tied to a larger political project of racial exclusion and control, what he termed a “deadly symbiosis”. Writing several years before Michelle Alexander produced her seminal work *The New Jim Crow* to explain the advent of
mass incarceration (2009), Wacquant argued that prisons eventually replaced the
ghetto as an even more efficient means to control and exploit a population brought
for cheap labor that was now regarded as unnecessary and an impediment to social
progress. For Wacquant, the failure of urban public schools was a manifestation of
these historic trends (he points out that they weren’t “failing” when they served the
white working class), and that now they often generate what he termed negative
social capital by undermining the communities they are supposed to serve because
they operate without a sense of accountability to local residents. In contrast with
what might be termed “positive” social capital, which is frequently characterized as
a resource that can be deployed to further group or individual interests (Coleman
1998), “negative” social capital weakens bonds between individuals by sowing
distrust and the abandonment of local public institutions (Wacquant 1998).

While their work has focused primarily on an explanation of persistent
poverty rather than the failure of school reform, in their attention to political
economy Wilson and Wacquant provide a basis for understanding the social context
where policies pursued in the name of education reform have been launched. As I
will show, most of have these policies, with the notable exception of the community-
school model being implemented in Tulsa-Union, have focused exclusively on what
was happening within schools while deliberately ignoring how the social context
interacts with the operation of schools. As a result, not only have the current reform
policies failed to deliver the positive changes that were promised, they have actually
contributed to the instability and deterioration of the poorest and most marginal
neighborhoods in several cities. In the pages ahead I will show how the reform
strategies pursued in New York and Tulsa-Union have affected the quality of life in poor neighborhoods in the hope that these case studies can illustrate how the interplay between the local social context and the current wave of school reform.

**A Tale of Two Cities: The Impact of School Reform on New York and Tulsa-Union**

The two cities I’ve chosen for this analysis provide an interesting vantage point from which to study how cities are being affected by the current wave of reform. To some degree, the choice is arbitrary; there are very few cities in the United States that have not experienced some degree of change as a result of the current reform movement. In fact, both of the cities I have chosen to examine have undergone similar reforms: major changes in the way school districts are administered, school choice and the rapid expansion of charter schools, new teacher evaluation systems, etc. However, the context in which these reforms have occurred make these two cases interesting if nothing else. In New York, the billionaire Mayor Michael Bloomberg committed himself to overhauling the nation’s largest school system with technocratic efficiency. In one of the nation’s reddest states (Oklahoma), a different strategy has been pursued in Tulsa-Union, one that might criticized as a form of socialism were it not occurring in America’s heartland, being led by Republic political leaders, and funded by oil companies.

In both cases, I focus on different aspects of the current reform agenda: mayoral control, school closure and the rapid expansion of charter schools in New York, the embrace of universal pre-school and community schools in Tulsa-Union. Again, I will spend less time examining the reforms themselves and devote most of
my attention to their impact on the cities and local communities where they occurred. In this way I hope to illuminate who gains or loses (and how) when schools are reformed in these ways. Assessing the impact of education reform on the urban communities they were intended to benefit is a topic that has rarely been issue addressed by those who study school reform. Even among the increasingly strident advocates who frequently rationalize their actions as necessary to breathe new life into a failed enterprise (public education), and in many cases describe their efforts as part of the “Civil Rights movement of the 21st century”, rarely do they consider the effects of their policies and actions on the communities where they have been carried out.

**Remaking Schools in New York City**

The election of Michael Bloomberg just two months after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2011, was heralded as a major change for New York City and its politics. Bloomberg succeeded Rudolf Giuliani, a polarizing figure who gained national prominence in the wake of 9/11. Giuliani alienated large segments of the African American and Latino communities who regarded him as indifferent at best and in many cases hostile to the needs of their communities, while simultaneously embracing repressive policing tactics. Though Bloomberg was also a Republican in a largely Democratic city, he presented himself as an independent and impartial businessman; a technocrat who would use the skills he acquired in business to solve the problems plaguing this large and unruly city.
From the very beginning, Bloomberg made it clear that he intended to focus on reforming the city's public schools that he derided as subpar and inefficient. His first move was to petition the state legislature for control of the system, contending that by taking power away from the democratically elected Board of Education, the system could be managed more effectively. Next, following an extensive public search for a chancellor to lead the nation's largest school system, during which the mayor made clear his intention to hire a non-educator, he settled upon a former member of the Clinton Justice Department, attorney Joel Klein, who had made his name leading a lawsuit against the technology giant Microsoft in a high profile anti-trust case. Like Bloomberg, Klein made it clear from the start that his goal was not to merely tinker with the system but to redesign, shake up and totally transform it. Klein described the stability created by labor-management cooperation as “the elixir of the status quo”; a state of affairs he claimed was producing rampant failure (Klein 2011).

Initially, many of the changes launched by Bloomberg and Klein focused on how the system would be managed. Larger administrative regions replaced the community school districts that had been in place for decade. In a 2003 public meeting called to assess the state of the city, Bloomberg announced that the 40 community district superintendents would be replaced, calling the “notorious bureaucratic dinosaurs” (Gendar 1/16/03). A new leadership academy was established designed to train principals and other administrative leaders in corporate managerial techniques with support from General Electric and its former
CEO, Jack Welch. Soon after, Klein announced that under the new accountability system schools would be graded based on how well their students performed.

In a move rich with symbolism, the headquarters of the Board of Education was moved from its offices in Brooklyn which Bloomberg referred to as a “rinky dink candy store”, to the old Tweed Courthouse adjacent to City Hall, changing the name to the Department of Education (DOE). Following a cue from Bloomberg’s financial information firm, private offices were replaced with cubicles, ostensibly for the purpose of fostering communication among the managers in charge of the mammoth system. The changes were more than cosmetic. A new breed of manager: young, smart, and mostly white and often, upper middle class, was running the new system, replacing a more diverse cadre of senior educators. More than a few had MBAs but no more than two or three years of teaching experience, despite their impressive administrative titles and major new responsibilities.

When the financial crisis of 2008 hit New York City, Bloomberg was able to successfully engineer a third term for himself, despite the fact that the City’s charter limited the mayor to two (Chen and Barbarao 2009). Claiming that only a leader with his financial acumen could steer city government through the economic crisis, and during the campaign he and Klein boldly asserted that the gains achieved by his administration in public education were nothing short of remarkable. According to DOE data, graduation rates and test scores were rising, and the so-called achievement gap was closing (Hill 2013). In the months before the election over 80% of the city’s schools received an A or B on the DOE’s evaluation system (Medina 2010). Although many of the gains asserted by the DOE evaporated when the State
Education Department re-calibrated the test scores and found that very little progress had actually been achieved (Medina 2010). Coincidently, the sobering news from the state was delivered after Bloomberg had secured his third term, which he used to claim a mandate for continuing his brand of education reform.

The school ratings were particularly important because they provided the justification for one of the Administration’s most far-reaching education policies. As a strategy for stimulating further improvement Bloomberg and the DOE began shutting down schools deemed to be failing based on their accountability system. By the end of his third term in 2013, Bloomberg and the DOE had closed 160 schools. This was by far one of the most radical and controversial of the measures undertaken by the Bloomberg administration in their effort to reform public education. Despite presenting evidence that the schools selected for closure were failing according to the criteria established by the DOE (e.g. test scores, graduation rates, etc.), in many cases, teachers, students and parents from these schools rallied to keep them open. At meetings of the Panel on Educational Policy (PEP), the body authorized to approve the closures (the majority of the PEP are appointed by the Mayor and the remainder by each of the five borough presidents), each vote for closure became more contentious and generated more opposition. Despite the fact that the Chancellor made a clear and compelling case that the schools were failing and therefore in need of closure, large numbers of people turned out to plead for the schools to remain open.

A closer analysis of where the “failing” schools were located and who was served by them reveals a clear and distinct pattern. A disproportionate number of
the schools targeted for closure were located in the poorest neighborhoods of the City. For example, in Brooklyn neighborhoods such as Brownsville, Bedford Stuyvesant, East New York and Bushwick, most of the middle and high schools received either a D or F on their school ratings (Schott, 2012). Closer analysis of the schools targeted for closure also revealed that even those not located in poor neighborhoods were disproportionately serving the most disadvantaged students—English language learners, students with learning disabilities, and poor students generally. A 2009 report by Parthenon, a private consulting firm, commissioned by the NYC Department of Education, showed that the city’s “failing schools” had deliberately been required to enroll a disproportionate number of “high need” students. The report suggested that the problem was related to the fact that many selective public and charter schools were allowed to screen or counsel out the most disadvantaged children. The report found, “Nearly 80% of variance among individual schools performance can be explained by a few factors, amongst which, enrollment size and concentration of low level students (both ELA and Math) are the most important (Parthenon 2009). The DOE assured parents that superior new schools would replace the schools that were closed. However, because of the school choice system that was implemented in 2003, there was no guarantee that children from the neighborhoods affected by closures would have access to these schools. Furthermore, the phase-out plan adopted by the DOE insured that none of the students in the schools designated as failing would have access to the new schools.2

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2 The DOE school closure plan called for schools to shrink gradually over time by not allowing new cohorts of 9th graders in the case of high schools, or 6th graders in the case of middle schools, to
Neighborhood Effects

A study conducted by MDRC (Manpower Research and Development Corporation) found that many of the newly created schools did in fact perform better than the schools they replaced (MDRC 2012). However, a report by Norman Fruchter from the Annenberg Institute at Brown University entitled: *Is Demography Destiny* (2012), found that the creation of new schools did not alter the dynamic of school failure in the City’s poorest neighborhoods. The chart below shows the strong correlation between low rates of college readiness, and the racial composition of schools and neighborhoods in Brooklyn and the Bronx.

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<th>% College Ready</th>
<th>% of Student Population Black/Latino</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East New York</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Hill</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>99</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Baychester</td>
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<td>93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edenwald</td>
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<tr>
<td>Melrose</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hunt’s Point</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Tremont</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mount Hope</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>Bathgate</td>
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<td>Brownsville</td>
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<td>Crotona Park</td>
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The neighborhoods with lowest rates of college readiness also happen to be the poorest neighborhoods in New York City. According to a report by the Community Service Society in 2013, these neighborhoods had unemployment rates for African American men that were well over 50% before the recession of 2008. Additionally, enroll. A report by the Annenberg Institute found that teacher and student attrition at the schools subjected to phase out was higher than at other schools because all who could found ways to “abandon the sinking ship” (Annenberg 2012).
in contrast to the gentrifying neighborhoods in other parts of the cities, these areas continued to have high rates of crime and violence (CSS 2013). As part of the Bloomberg-Klein strategy, new charter schools were established in some of these neighborhoods. Yet, despite evidence suggesting that many of the charter schools out-performed DOE schools in the same neighborhoods, achievement indicators for children in the neighborhoods showed no improvement (Annenberg 2013).

Although Bloomberg and Klein claimed that the purpose of their reforms was to benefit those who had been poorly served in the past, the evidence showed that schools in high poverty neighborhoods had not improved despite the fact that so many of the schools designated as failing had been closed (Schott 2012).

In March 2010 State Supreme Court Justice Joan B. Lobis temporarily halted the closing of 19 schools, ruling that the DOE had not provided adequate analysis and information to the public related to the impact that the closings would have on communities. However, the court’s ruling was only a temporary setback for Mayor Bloomberg and Chancellor Klein who pressed ahead and managed to close dozens more schools before his term of office ended. All of the 19 schools served an extremely high proportion of at-risk students. An average of 94 percent of students in the schools were African American or Latino, 10 percent were designated as limited proficient in English, 18 percent were in special education and 11 percent are overage for their grade level (Noguera 2010). Among the high schools that the DOE wanted to close a large number had entered the ninth grade below grade level in reading and math. Finally, many of the targeted schools had received high numbers of “over the counter students”; transfer students who enroll in school long
after the school year has begun. A large number of these students have weak academic preparation or significant periods of interrupted formal education. According to Judge Lobis, there was no evidence that the schools the DOE wanted to close had been provided with the resources needed to support the students they had been required to serve.

Despite the court ruling, Bloomberg managed to continue pursuing his reform agenda till the day he left office. He also maintained that under his leadership schools had improved. He pointed to graduation rates which rose to 64% during his twelve years in office, ignoring data collected by CUNY Institutional Research Center that found 80 percent of New York City graduates admitted to CUNY (City University of New York) colleges were required to enroll in remedial courses, effectively repeating classes they were supposed to have taken and passed while in high school. Bloomberg also maintained that his support for choice and charter schools had significantly increased the supply and availability of good schools in the city, ignoring the fact that several studies showed the new charter schools were under-enrolling English language learners, the undocumented, homeless children and students with special needs (Banchero and Porter 2012).

The school closure strategy also exposed a crucial weakness in Bloomberg and the DOE’s approach to reform. Throughout his twelve years in office neither he nor Klein ever made it clear how this strategy would lead to better schools for the most disadvantaged students in the most marginalized neighborhoods. As the Parthenon study of 2009 showed, a disproportionate number of students in the schools targeted for closure were English language learners, students with severe
learning disabilities, students who are academically behind when they enter high school. Despite imposing a grade retention policy in 4th, 6th and 8th grade for students who failed to perform beyond the lowest level on standardized tests, the administration never offered an explanation nor conducted an evaluation to find out why so many students were still entering high school at the lowest level of achievement. They also did little to address the high turnover of teachers at schools in the poorest neighborhoods (Schott 2012) and did little to support or stabilize them.

Writing about Bloomberg-Klein’s stance toward low-income communities, McDonald and his colleagues write:

...Bloomberg and Klein did little to support or increase grassroots civic capacity. Indeed, they tended to spurn grassroots civic capacity as unsophisticated at best and corrupting at worst. Although they instituted a system of parent coordinators for every school, they also disempowered the community school boards and offices that had been the principal channel for parental voice and participation. Moreover, the continual restructuring of district offices and the geographical diffusion of the support organizations left parents and other community stakeholders confused about who held the power to address their questions, concerns, and grievances. (p. 51)

Given the stance they took toward community engagement it is hardly surprising that community concerns and needs were rarely considered as relevant to the reform agenda in New York City.

**A Different Path for Tula-Union**

Located in the northeast corner of the state, Tulsa is a mid-sized city (46th largest in the US) and together with Union and surrounding areas is the second...
largest metropolitan area in Oklahoma, with fewer than one million people. Since its' founding in the late 19th century, the region’s economy has been highly dependent upon oil production, and residents often refer to it as the “oil capital of the world”. Tulsa was home to a community known as the "Black Wall Street"; one of the most prosperous African American communities in the United States in the late nineteenth century (Ellsworth 2007). Located in the Greenwood neighborhood, the area was destroyed by fire and mob violence in 1921, during what is now commonly referred to as the Tulsa Race Riot, one of the nation’s worst acts of racial violence and civil disorder. After sixteen hours of rioting on May 31st and June 1st, as many as 300, mostly black people, were killed, over 800 people were admitted to local hospitals with injuries, and an estimated 10,000 people were left homeless as a result of fire (Stulzburger 2011). Efforts to obtain reparations for survivors of the violence have been unsuccessful though the city and state later acknowledged the violence and devastation and supported the erection of a memorial to the victims.

Schools in Tulsa and Union are more diverse than schools in New York City which were recently identified as among the most segregated in the nation (cite). Of the nearly 40,000 students enrolled in Tulsa approximately 28% are Caucasian, 28% are African American, 28% are Hispanic, 7% are Native American and just over 1% are Asian American. Approximately 79% of students in the school district qualify for free or reduced price lunch. (http://www.tulsaschools.org/4_About_District/fast_facts_main.asp). With just over 15,000 students, Union also serves a relatively diverse student population: 5.6% Native American, 14.7% African-American, 7.5% multi-racial, 7% Asian, 65%
Caucasian, and 25% Hispanic. Approximately 3,620 students were bilingual or lived in a home where a language other than English was spoken. Like Tulsa, the vast majority of children served by schools in Union come from households in poverty (80%) ([http://www.unionps.org/index.cfm?id=20](http://www.unionps.org/index.cfm?id=20)).

In 2007, the Tulsa Area Community Schools Initiative (TACSI) was established through the Tulsa Metropolitan Human Services Commission (MHSC). Though the focus of the initiative is to provide services to children and families through the public schools, it is administered by the Community Service Council (CSC) rather than the school districts and guided by a community steering committee. A Management Team leads the TACSI Resource Center at CSC, with leaders from the two participating school districts (Union and Tulsa) represented but not in control. The structure was designed to foster a sense of shared accountability amongst district and civic leaders in the two cities and to engage key institutions in supporting the implementation and support of TACSI. TACSI is a participant in the national Coalition for Community Schools ([http://www.communityschools.org/](http://www.communityschools.org/)), a consortium that provides support to similar initiatives throughout the United States. TACSI currently works with over 150 community partner organizations that work together to develop social and educational capacity within schools and provide resources to support the social and psychological needs of children. The goal of the partnership is to create opportunities for “increased stability in families and in communities, as well as providing rich experiences for children.” ([http://csctulsa.org/content.php?p=29](http://csctulsa.org/content.php?p=29))
According to documents from TACSI, more than nine thousand students and families are served by TACSI each year. All elementary schools in low-income neighborhoods throughout the Tulsa area are served by TACSI. The goal is to build a “web of innovative programs, services, and opportunities to support the success of students and to promote healthy families and engaged communities” (http://csctulsa.org/content.php?p=29).

The map below shows where community schools are located in Tulsa-Union. It is important to note that not only do nearly all of the elementary schools operate as full service community schools, they also provide a broad array of services including: early childhood education, health services and health education, mental health and social services, youth development and recreation, after school support programs, and family and community engagement initiatives.
Tulsa-Union is not alone in embracing the concept of building a social safety net for children. Since 1988, the State of Oklahoma has made early childhood education available to all children through public funding. According to Skip Steele, a Republican member of the Tulsa City Council “This isn’t a liberal issue. This is about investing on our kids. It just makes sense.”(Kristoff, 2013) The Oklahoma early childhood initiative was made possible in part by the financial contributions of George B. Kaiser, a Tulsa billionaire who made his money in the oil industry. Kaiser
claims that he became an advocate and investor in early childhood education after becoming aware of research in neuroscience that shows the impact of early interventions on the development of the brain. Because of his prominence and money, politicians were willing to listen to the evidence he presented and the moral argument he made - that all children should have access to early learning opportunities.

In addition to community schools, Tulsa-Union has embraced the Obama administration’s Promise Neighborhood initiative to advance its efforts to combat poverty in the poorest areas. The initiative is based in the Kendall-Whittier and Eugene Field sections of Tulsa where 30% of the households have incomes that fall below the poverty line, and forty-six percent of residents are Latino, the fastest growing ethnic group in the metropolitan region. The theory of change described in the Promise Neighborhood proposal focuses upon making early childhood education available for every three year old combined with interventions designed to strengthen the economic and physical health of low-income parents to reduce intergenerational poverty. The effort is financed by a combination of public and private funds and not dependent upon ongoing support from the federal government.

The Promise Neighborhood initiative is part of a larger strategy being pursued throughout the Tulsa-Union metropolitan area to use education as a central part of the strategy for countering poverty and boosting economic development in poor neighborhoods. The plan appears to be registering some progress. Community schools, the opening of several new recreation and arts centers, the
expansion of job training opportunities through adult education programs offered by local universities and several new housing developments in several of the poorest neighborhoods, are all part of the Tulsa-Union strategy to reduce poverty. In contrast with the rhetoric espoused by many in the new education reform movement, and the strategy pursued by Michael Bloomberg in New York City, there is an explicit recognition that schools alone cannot combat poverty and that a more comprehensive strategy is needed (Hollis 2014).

Tulsa-Union continues to face significant challenges with respect to poverty and the quality of life in poor communities. Although unemployment rates are relatively low (5%), poverty rates have risen in recent years. In 2012 35% of all children under age five came from households in poverty (Community Service Council 2012). Poverty rates are highest among the fast growing Latino population, and relatively few Latinos have been employed in professional roles in the public sector where advocacy for services is most likely to occur. Nonetheless, the commitment to building a safety net for children in Tulsa-Union sets its reform strategy apart from most others taking place in major US cities today. Only time will tell whether or not the strategy is successful in meeting the educational needs of students and enhancing the quality of life in the neighborhoods where they and their families reside.

Conclusion
New York and Tulsa-Union provide interesting contexts from which to compare and contrast the ways in which the education reform strategies being pursued are impacting poor, urban communities. Though school improvement and higher levels of academic achievement have been embraced as goals by both cities, the strategies employed to realize these goals have been markedly different. By analyzing the differences in these strategies and assessing their impact on the schools and communities that have been targeted by the initiatives, it is possible to make explicit how cities generally and low-income neighborhoods specifically are affected by different approaches to education reform.

During the Bloomberg years (2002 – 2013), New York became the showcase for what is now termed “market-based reform” (Lipman 2011; Fullan 2014). Private foundations, hedge fund companies, banks and wealthy individuals embraced the Bloomberg strategy and contributed significant sums of money to support it. The Gates Foundation alone contributed over one billion dollars to the development of dozens of new schools throughout New York City (Ravitch 2008). Bloomberg and his Chancellor Joel Klein, too a “no holds barred” approach as they pursued their reform agenda, and swiftly dismissed all critics as defenders of the status quo. In a striking contrast to the strategy pursued in Tulsa-Union (and supported by at least one oil billionaire there), poverty was treated as an unimportant issue in New York. In fact, in an editorial written by Klein and his allies that appeared in the April 9, 2010 edition of the *Washington Post* he wrote:

> In the debate over how to fix American public education, many believe that schools alone cannot overcome the impact that economic disadvantage has
on a child, that life outcomes are fixed by poverty and family circumstances, and that education doesn't work until other problems are solved. This theory is, in some ways, comforting for educators... Problem is, the theory is wrong. It’s hard to know how wrong but plenty of evidence demonstrates that schools can make an enormous difference despite the challenges presented by poverty and family background.

To their supporters, such assertions were encouraging because they suggested that poverty would not be an obstacle to the success of the Bloomberg reform agenda. However, as poverty and homeless rates rose in New York City, particularly during and after the recession of 2008, it became increasingly clear that the idea that poverty could be ignored was not only naïve, but in some ways even callous. In 2012, child poverty rates in New York City rose to their highest level in over 10 years. While the child poverty rate for the US rose to 22%, in New York City it rose to over 31% (Roberts 2013). While Bloomberg and Klein may not be responsible for the rise in poverty, their steadfast refusal to acknowledge the problem or to direct additional help to the schools that were serving the greatest number of poor children left many schools across the city foundering.

Ironically, while the “no excuses” strategy was popular in a politically liberal city like New York, Republican controlled Tulsa-Union was constructing a safety net for poor children, a strategy that evoked memories of the War on Poverty policies of Lyndon B. Johnson. Like the reforms carried out in New York City, the Tulsa-Union strategy was backed with funding from private philanthropist but guided by local community leaders who established TACSI. Ironically, Bloomberg enthusiastically supported the Harlem Children’s Zone developed by Geoffrey Canada, an anti-poverty program that provided a broad array of academic and social services to
6,000 poor children in central Harlem. Yet, he and the DOE refused to adopt similar strategies at the schools located at the poorest neighborhoods in the city despite clear evidence that these schools were experiencing the highest degree of failure. During the Bloomberg years, the only strategy put forward to address their struggles was closure.

In Tulsa-Union the commitment to create community schools in high-poverty neighborhoods was combined with a willingness to develop partnerships with community-based organizations that would take the lead in providing some services (particularly after school programs) and conducting outreach to families. According to community activists like Frances Jordan Rakestraw, the Executive Director of the Greenwood Cultural Center, and attorney Hannibal Johnson in Tulsa, community schools opened the door to “parents and community leaders who care about the welfare of our children. It has given us a sense of ownership over our schools and a way to be involved.” (interview, June 2014). While private foundations provide the bulk of the funding to support the initiative, the board directing TACSI is comprised of a diverse cross section of community members who have deep roots in the communities where the programs are based. The rapidly growing Latino population is the one community that is significantly underrepresented in leadership of the Tulsa-Union reform initiative. According to district leaders, this is an issue that they are working on and hope to address in the near future.

Poor communities in New York and Tulsa-Union continue to beset by enormous hardships and challenges. Angie Avery, a community activist with the community schools network in Tulsa, told me that a recent food give-away in Tulsa
generated long lines with hundreds of people. “We knew there were lots of people who were living on the edge but we had no idea how many. Given the lines we saw I can only imagine how many families with children must be going hungry on a regular basis. We’re doing a lot to help them but we have to do more.” (June 20, 2014)

The same could be said of New York. In what was widely seen as a repudiation of Bloomberg and his policies, New York voters elected Bill de Blasio mayor in 2013. De Blasio was widely seen as the anti-Bloomberg; an unabashed progressive who promised to focus on reducing poverty and inequality once elected. Like public officials in Tulsa-Union, de Blasio campaigned on a promise that he would make access to pre-school universal and bring an array of social services into public schools to help in addressing social issues related to poverty. While it is far too early to assess the effectiveness of his education policies or their impact upon low-income communities, there is no doubt that public schools in New York City are now on a different course.

Bipartisan support for community schools is now beginning to emerge in the US Congress. A bill recently introduced by House Minority Whip Steny Hoyer (D-MD) and Rep. Aaron Schock (R-IL) called: the Full Service Community Schools Act, may come up for a vote in the next session of Congress. Marty Blank, the President of the Coalition for Community Schools, explains that “The bill authorizes funding for full-service community schools, which ... can be found in nearly 100 places across the country, from Oakland, CA and Cincinnati, OH to Lincoln, NE and Albuquerque, NM. If authorized, this bill would increase the number of places
implementing community schools across the country, and enlist communities as key partners for student success.” If this bill were to be passed by the highly polarized Congress, it could very well signal a major shift in the direction of education reform nationally.

The race-class dynamics of education reform in New York and Tulsa-Union also provide an interesting basis for comparison. In New York, a top down approach was taken in which reformers from City Hall and the DOE determined how the failing schools in the poorest communities would be fixed. The approach taken was highly paternalistic in nature because the architects assumed they alone possessed the technical expertise needed to address the chronic school failure. In Tulsa-Union, not only was poverty identified as a central focus of reform, but also community partners were embraced as partners in the effort. As a result of this effort, individuals from marginalized neighborhoods in Tulsa-Union described themselves as “empowered and engaged” in the school reform work, while in New York most neighborhood activists found themselves protesting decisions made about their schools by powerful elites.

McDonald (2014) reminds us in his most recent book that the history of educational policy in the United States over the last 30 years has been characterized by sweeping reform initiatives that have been offered periodically as a means to overhaul and elevate American education to new heights. When promoted by elected officials, the reforms have typically been offered as a means for the nation to maintain its competitive advantage. Tyack and Cuban (1995) have described such efforts “as an elusive march toward utopia” (p. XX). They point out that the grand
promises of reform that are typically issued each time a new administration
assumes office have often ignored the underlying social and economic challenges
that impact education: “Leaders inside and outside of education generally share a
common vision of scientific management as a blueprint for re-organizing the school
system. Such approaches avoid intractable problems such as social inequality and
racial discrimination and place unrealistic expectations upon schools” (p. 46).
Sociologist Charles Payne, in his critique of major school reform initiatives carried
out in Chicago over the last 10 to 15 years has made a similar point. He asks: “So
much reform . . . why so little change?”(2008). For poor people in urban
communities throughout the United States, that question continues as pertinent as
ever.
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